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Abstract 
Mental time travel allows us to re-visit our memories and imagine future scenarios, 
and this is why memories are not only about the past, they are also prospective. 
These episodic memories are not a fixed store of what happened, however; they are 
reassessed each time they are revisited and depend on the sequence in which events 
unfold. In this paper we shall explore the complex relationships between memory 
and human experience, including through a series of novels ‘The Moustachio 
Quartet’ that can be read in any order. To do so we shall integrate evidences from 
science and the arts to explore the subjective nature of memory and mental time 
travel, and argue that it has evolved primarily for prospection as opposed to 
retrospection. Furthermore we shall question the notion that mental time travel is a 
uniquely human construct, and argue that some of the best evidence for the 
evolution of mental time travel comes from our distantly related cousins, the corvids, 
that cache food for the future and rely on long-lasting and highly accurate memories 
of what, where and when they stored their stashes of food. 
 
Keywords 
Memory, mental time travel, The Moustachio Quartet, convergence, comparative 
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Introduction 
Our ways of seeing (e.g. Berger, 1972) are based on memory and the anticipation of 
what comes next. There are those that argue this is all there is. Memory is a foreign 
land that only exists in the present, the space where all life exists. Would the world’s 
archives make sense if there were no one there to access the meanings of all that 
went before? It could be argued that time, and the way in which we use it, is a 
uniquely human concept, and not one that is replicated in the wider universe. The 
concept of mental time travel, that ability to travel backwards and forwards in the 
mind’s eye in order to contextualise the present, is well known. However we are 
probably out of step with the universe by assuming that time can move backwards 
and forwards, at least physical time. If we look for evidence of time in the wider 
universe all we have been able to detect are a series of unfolding events that move 
remorselessly in one direction. This is the process of entropy, which goes so far as to 
suggest that there is no way to unbreak an egg. The thesis that follows comes out of 
such observations. 
 
The anomalies that occur in our thinking are fascinating, and outside of science can 
be observed in the art and writing of our cultures across millennia, an analysis of 
which suggests that memories are curious things and are central to our every day 
lives and make us who we are, and cause us to question the very nature of reality. 
We shall argue that memories are made for the future not the past, and 
reconstructed each time they are revisited. Facts about the past are preserved 
although the complexion of how they are remembered changes; in consequence of 
which none of these things are an accurate record of what happened, despite our own 
underlying prejudice. That is because what we remember becomes what happened: 
the re-visiting of memories results in the re-contextualising of thoughts, and the 
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updating of perceived knowledge. 
 
This ability to project the self in time allows us to imagine events that have never 
happened and to travel to places to which we have never been, other than in the 
mind’s eye.  We swim in a subjective sea of time, which changes from moment to 
moment, surrounded by an ever-present awareness that what once was the future 
will soon become the past and that the real future will never be quite the one we 
imagined. Without memory thought would have no anchor. Memory allows us to 
use the past to create the future, it is the trigger to inspire new ideas, and generates 
the flexibility in our imagination that allows us to do so, all be it embedded within 
the scaffold of what we already know. We contextualize the present and the future: 
in such ways we embody mental time travel as a primary resource for making sense 
of our subjective experience. Our personal memories of the past are intimately 
entwined with our thoughts about the future. We rely on our episodic cognition, our 
mental time travel system, to reminisce, this being one reason why our memories 
need to travel forwards as well as backwards in time1. In this paper we shall explore 
notions of memory and mental time travel. In so doing we will examine convergent 
evidence, adopting a comparative analysis that interweaves science with the arts, 
investigating both human and non-human animals. 
 
What are the core features of Mental Time Travel? 
It was Endel Tulving (1983) who coined the term episodic memory to clarify that 
our ability to remember the past is a psychologically distinct process from other 
forms of memory such as body memory (procedural memory) and knowing facts 
about the world (semantic memory). Tulving identified two key phenomenological 
                                                 
1 A second reason is that we also have prospective memories, namely the ability to remember to do something in the future e.g. 
making a mental note in the morning to buy a bottle of wine on the way home from work for a dinner party that evening.  
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features of memory and mental time travel, namely autonoesis and chronesthesia 
(Tulving, 2002, 2005). Autonoesis refers to a special kind of self-consciousness that 
allows us to reflect upon our memories, knowing that we are the authors and owners 
of those thoughts. So what we have done in the past becomes a part of our self and 
the ability to reflect upon this influences our behaviours in the present (see also 
Wheeler, 2000). “It’s no use going back to yesterday, because I was a different 
person then” said Alice in Lewis Carroll’s (1865) clever tale Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland. Memory is the door to identity: it shapes who we are (Clayton & 
Wilkins, in press) although it does not destroy it (see Craver et al. 2014 for example). 
Chronesthesia refers to another kind of consciousness that lies at the heart of 
memory, namely our awareness of the passage of time, of being able to travel 
backwards and forwards in the mind’s eye to revisit the past in order to anticipate 
how we might position ourselves in the future.  
 
These phenomenological features of episodic memory have been impossible to access 
in non-human animals to date, due to the lack of agreed behavioural markers of 
consciousness in non-linguistic creatures. There are accompanying behavioural 
features of memory and mental time travel that Tulving originally referred to as the 
spatio-temporal relations between events (Tulving, 1972). In essence this is the 
ability to form integrated episodic-like memories of what happened where and when 
(Clayton & Dickinson, 1998), which allows the subject to discriminate between 
similar episodes that occurred at different times and/ or locations (Griffiths et al. 
1999). This information can be deployed flexibly not only for memories of the past 
but also to imagine and plan for future events (Clayton et al., 2003a, Clayton, in 
press).  It is these behavioural criteria of mental time travel that can be assessed in 
non-human animals, a point to which we shall return later. 
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Tulving (1972) was also the first to make the distinction between remembering and 
knowing. Knowing requires the use of semantic cognition, the ability to acquire and 
store facts about the world, but such knowledge of the past and future does not 
necessarily require an awareness of either the projection of the self or time, and 
largely consists of a series of selfless, timeless labels (the obvious exception being the 
semantic knowledge of one’s birth date, which is not accompanied by any episodic 
remembrance of the actual birth). By contrast, remembering requires a separate, all 
be it embedded system, namely that of episodic cognition, the ability to project the 
self in space and time to imagine the future and recall the past. As William James so 
eloquently remarked (James, 1890, p. 6509), “Memory requires more than the mere 
dating of a fact in the past, it must be dated in my past. In other words I must think 
that I directly experienced its occurrence”.  This is not to say that the semantic 
system plays no role however.  Indeed semantic scaffolding hypothesis argues that 
semantic memory provides a crucial scaffold in which to embed the subjective 
experiences, a framework with which to evaluate and contextualise the episodic 
contribution to past and future (Irish et al 2012, Irish & Piquet 2013, see also 
Michaelian et al 2016 for a current review). 
 
As we alluded to in the introduction, remembering is subjective and the 
interpretation of one’s thoughts are open to conjecture and review whenever it 
becomes necessary to recall them. The process is beautifully described in the 
following: “You don’t remember what happened. What you remember becomes what 
happened” as Green (2006) expressed in his amusing novel, An Abundance of 
Katherines. As in life, stories rely heavily on the sequence in which events unfold and 
this colours the way in which we interpret our perceptions and our memories.  The 
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reconstructive nature of memory has its scientific origins in the work of Sir Frederic 
Bartlett (1932). In his book Remembering, he describes a study in which participants 
read and then retell a North American Indian folktale The War of the Ghosts 
involving a battle between ghostly warriors. The participants distorted the story to 
fit in with their pre-existing knowledge structures, omitting the sections that 
seemed irrelevant, and changed the emphasis and structure of the story to match 
their own experience of how the world works. 
 
It is now well established that our episodic memories of past events can change each 
time we revisit them, depending on our mood and point of view. This causes us to 
frequently question the authenticity of memory, pondering the validity and meaning 
of experience~ What was real, what was imagined; what, if any of it at all, will be 
real tomorrow? Our thoughts and perceptions of the past and future are transformed 
through time. Sometimes the alterations that ensue cr ate a false memory that never 
actually happened. The seminal studies of Elizabeth Loftus have revealed how easily 
memory recall can be manipulated through language, overriding the perceptual 
feedback of the event itself (Loftus 1974, 1975, 2005). For example, when 
participants were asked to view videos of a car accident with collisions at 20, 30 and 
40 miles an hour respectively, and then asked to judge how fast the cars were going 
when the accident occurred, their responses were primarily influenced not by the 
perceived speed at which the cars were actually going, but by the choice of words, 
such as “smashed” as opposed to “bumped”, that were used to phrase the question. 
When asked additional details about the event such as whether or not they had seen 
any broken glass at the scene, participants were much more likely to report the 
presence of broken glass if the word “smashed” had been used to pose the question 
(Loftus, 1974).  Our memories are so malleable that they are not only reconstructed 
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but in some cases, misconstrued (Loftus et al., 1978). A case in point is the way in 
which magic effects work in the mind successfully disorientating and obscuring our 
perception and ability to remember what happened.  
 
Our awareness of these notions is explored in the following extract from The 
Moustachio Quartet (Wilkins, 2015a, p. 48) 
 “Xavier had launched himself, before midnight, into the darkened city, to follow his 
idiosyncratic and nocturnal inclinations, to take note of the confusing world he found himself 
in and to wonder. In the gloom, he had followed the lines of the streets with his thoughts and 
had eventually found himself at the tango by the river. The dancing was glorious and he had 
lost himself to moments that opened up for him. The release, as ever, had been joyous; he felt 
he was outside of time. The spirit of the experience flashes before him; he observes it, remotely 
quantifying the sensations, checking and wondering if his observations still matched his 
earlier recollection. Even in this short time, Xavier recognised that his sense of recall, his 
remembrance and his emotional responses had become altered in some way beyond his control. 
What had been missed or forgotten? What had altered?” 
 
 
This begs the question why episodic memories and perceptions are so labile and not 
simply a fixed repository of the past. The answer lies in the fact that our memories 
are as much about what will happen next, as about what has already occurred, and 
indeed it is thought that the episodic memory system evolved for thinking about the 
future rather than the past, the so-called Constructive Episodic Simulation 
hypothesis developed by Dan Schacter and colleagues (Schacter et al., 2007, 2008, 
2012).  This hypothesis posits that a crucial function of the brain is to use 
information gleaned from past experience to simulate a series of future scenarios and 
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in so doing allow us not only to juxtapose a number of alternatives, but crucially to 
predict and plan for those possible eventualities.  
 
This flexibility in our ability to simulate multiple points of view is great for 
creativity, allowing us to move our thoughts seamlessly between the past, the 
present and the future, and to reflect upon our thoughts and those of others, 
enabling us to juggle multiple perspectives involving other selves and other times~ 
all simultaneously in the mind’s eye. As we have argued previously (Clayton & 
Wilkins, 2012), we have an internal compass that we use to orient ourselves in space 
and time, to project ourselves into times past and future and even into other people’s 
lives, capturing a landscape that contains past, present and future, all of which can be 
accessed simultaneously. This Creative Navigator’s Compass comes at a cost in terms 
of accuracy~ our attention, our perception and our memories are selective and 
subjective: the brain anticipates what it expects to see and makes associations 
accordingly. Sometimes it can deceive itself. 
 
A source of such deception is the obsession of the self in the current moment~ we 
had a tendency to think that the future will be more like the present than it actually 
will be. Dan Gilbert (2006) describes this temporal myopia, or short sightedness, 
when it comes to envisioning futures, in his wonderfully entertaining book Stumbling 
on Happiness: for example he convincingly demonstrates that peoples’ choices of what 
they think they will want to eat tomorrow will be heavily influenced by their current 
motivational state, irrespective of whether or not those states will be experienced 
tomorrow (see also Cheke et al., 2016). For most of us this is a familiar experience: 
it’s seldom a good idea to go supermarket shopping when hungry~ that’s when we 
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make ill-informed dietary choices because of our inability to dissociate current needs 
from possible future ones.  
 
Such temporal myopia constrains our memories of what happened. It could be 
argued we fail to remember events because we are too busy reconstructing memories 
to fit into our existing schema of how the world works, and in so doing override 
what was actually perceived. Visual illusions and magic effects capitalize on these 
aspects of perception too, as does art, literature, music and dance (Laland et al., 
2015). The errors that illusions and other visual effects induce in our perceptions are 
systematic, revealing fundamental features of our perception. As Dan Gilbert (2006, 
p. 46) so eloquently states “they are not silly mistakes but clever mistakes, ones that 
allow those of us who understand them to glimpse the elegant design and inner 
workings of the mind”. The mistakes we make when we try to imagine our personal 
futures and reflect upon our treasured memories are also systematic and they too 
have a pattern that tells us about the powers and limitations of using our creative 
navigator’s compass to explore the world. We use our eyes to look into space, and 
our creative compass to circumnavigate space and time~ just as our eyes sometimes 
lead us into seeing things as they are not, our episodic cognition can lead us to 
remember things falsely and foresee things as they will not be (Clayton & Wilkins, 
in press).  ‘Boundary extension’ is a classic case in point. This is the phenomenon 
whereby people consistently perceive and imagine a greater expanse of a scene than 
the one they were actually shown (Intraub & Richardson, 1989). In essence, it is an 
error of commission in which people think they remember seeing a surrounding 
region of a scene that was not visible in the original view. Interestingly, it does not 
occur in response to all pictures, only those that convey scene structure, and 
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furthermore it does not occur for all boundaries within a scene, but only those 
boundaries that form the exterior to the view (Gottesman & Intraub, 2002, 2003).  
 
This is phenomenon long known to painters and photographers who work within a 
picture plane that has a defined edge and limit.  The art of composition and knowing 
where to finish an image is crucial to the communication of an idea. In order to make 
sense of an image the viewer most frequently will infer what went on moments 
before and will conjecture what is coming next. In addition they infer what is beyond 
the boundary. In so doing they invent more of the world and the story of that world 
than they were originally shown. Indeed, in a similar vein the theatrical proscenium 
arch allows the audience to suspend disbelief in the imaginative or artificial worlds 
that they experience. In this instance the arch although it describes the edge of the 
stage does not describe the edge of our imagination. 
 
Interestingly, not all minds are subject to boundary extension. Amnesiacs are not 
only impaired in their ability to remember the past, but in addition cannot imagine 
or reconstruct complex spatial scenes (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007, Hassabis et al., 
2007) and intriguingly they do not show the boundary extension phenomenon 
(Mulally et al., 2012), presumably because they do not have access to what we have 
referred to as the creative navigator’s compass.  
 
Convergent Evidence 1 
In the absence of the ability to engage in mental time travel the mind is left 
stranded~ in a dark place. Without the ability to engage in mental time travel the 
mind is equally left stranded, but in an unknown place. The hippocampus has a 
critical role in the difference between the two states of mind for this in an area of the 
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brain that plays a key role in memory and mental time travel.  
 
Henry Molaisson is undoubtedly the most famous case study highlighting 
hippocampal amnesia, but like many amnesiacs damage was not limited to only one 
region of the brain (Corkin, 2013). Another less well-known case is that of the 
British musicologist, conductor, tenor and keyboardist, Clive Wearing, known as 
“the man with the seven-second memory” 2 , who developed herpes simplex 
encephalitis causing irrevocable memory loss.  Perhaps the clearest evidence, 
however, comes from the seminal studies of patients such as Kent Cochrane (KC; 
Rosenbaum et al., 2004, Craver et al., 2014) and DB (Klein et al, 2002) who suffered 
specific impairments in episodic cognition, both in terms of remembering the past 
and imagining the future. KC and DB know facts about the past and can conjecture 
information about the future, but they cannot directly experience it: when asked to 
do so they report that their minds go blank and that they feel the same kind of 
blankness when asked to remember the past or imagine the future. The striking 
thing here is that neither can conjure a single event into their conscious awareness. 
They have no subjective experiences about themselves. It is as though they were not 
present when the events they are asked to describe actually happened but were 
merely told the facts afterwards. 
 
In analysis of amnesiacs we see the debilitating effects of life and consciousness in 
the absence of mental time travel. Primarily this results in the inability to 
contextualize the present. Examples abound: How can I know how I am feeling 
today without conscious access to a memory of how I was feeling yesterday, last 
week, last year? How do I know if I feel full immediately after a meal? Despite the 
                                                 
2 The Man With The Seven Second Memory (2005) directed by Jane Treays. 
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role of autonoesis and the claim that memory is the door to identity, memory loss 
alone, by report, does not leave the individual without personality or individual 
character traits (Wearing, 2005). This leaves one to conjecture whether aspects of 
identity are carried in the way we use language and accessed by other non-episodic 
forms of memory. 
 
Understanding aspects of what is lost in the absence of mental time travel makes any 
analysis of the fully functioning mind seem particularly incredible. The ability to 
marshal complex thought from a variety of viewpoints in analysis and formulate 
flexible strategies for thinking that provide a narrative for the future may be our 
greatest skill. Despite technologies that allow us to glimpse such gifts in action (e.g. 
functional magnetic resonance imaging) it may be the case that the fully functioning 
mind is still best observed in the artifacts we produce.  The following extract taken 
from The Moustachio Quartet (Wilkins, 2017, p. 23), although literature no doubt, 
illustrates the manner in which mental time travel can be used to place the individual 
in time and place, in our need to understand the miasma of being and the universe 
writ large. 
“It is mid-afternoon on another imagined day. Caruso Maelstrom stands on the steel deck, his 
familiar, boyish gaze passing over the paint spattered, chipped railing of the P&O passenger 
ferry; the far distant islands appearing as miniature outcrops of blue amidst the vast, cold, 
glistening, shimmering sea; passing waves might roll and undulate, airborne surf pound hard 
against the ships prow, delivering the smell of salt water and sea into this beautiful man’s 
flaring, open nostrils. He senses, from what he sees, that the ocean’s surface is only marginally 
warmer than what lieays beneath, in some other realm beyond. As he looks, sunshine and the 
crystal daylight radiate out across the oceanic vista, throwing the various hard territories and 
islands into degrees of relief, the prevailing detail determined by his proximity to their 
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majesty and magnitude. The nearest island, green-topped and brown-faced with igneous rock 
weathered over millennia is known to be the nesting place for seabirds. Guillemots are there 
flying still~ slicing through three dimensions~ gliding over the formidable and available 
rocky landmass. Listen, the sound of their remote cries and calls can be heard even now, 
passing silently through the air and travelling on discreet, secret, transient breezes, the noise 
only briefly, temporarily deadened by miscellaneous activity that has, in truth, happened 
since~ within the annals of human memory. All this occurred within space and time and has 
become no more than a remote symphony. That clouds, light and beauty exist within his 
consciousness in this re-imagined moment is a reality recognised to be too brief, ephemeral 
and so easily lost~ all this can only be remembered as belonging to a once known and 
impenetrably mislaid place, if it is remembered at all? Prompted by such airy thoughts the 
man imagines and inwardly glimpses a breath-taking void stretching out before him into an 
unknown and impossible distance.” 
 
 
The flexibility of the written narrative makes it difficult for the reader to know 
whether the description is happening in the present or the past or the future. Indeed 
the narrator is deliberately engaged in the act of disorientating themselves in order 
to find a way forward in their description of impossible questions, the answer to 
which at the end of the short sequence remain unresolved. Nevertheless the process 
of looking for clues and searching for answers without fully understanding the task 
in hand is intrinsic to the creative process. In the absence of knowing what to do, 
finding a way forward is paramount. 
 
Convergent Evidence 2 
So far our focus has been on human mental time travel, but are we unique in 
the animal kingdom in having the ability to remember the past and plan for the 
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future? There has been considerable debate as to whether mental time travel is 
uniquely human (e.g. Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997), or whether we share this 
cognitive ability with other animals (e.g. Clayton et al., 2003a; Corballis, 2013, 
2014).  The issue is not about whether animals can store, process and retrieve 
information about the past, but rather whether they use episodic cognition, the 
mental time travel system, to do so (Tulving, 1983). As we stated earlier, questions 
concerning autonoesis and chronesthesia in animals are at least currently outside the 
bounds of empirical enquiry, and it is open to conjecture whether animals experience 
boundary extension; such tests are yet to be conducted. What we do know, however, 
is that some animals can remember the what, where and when of past events and act 
prospectively (for recent reviews see Clayton, 2014; Clayton, in press) and that like 
humans, hippocampal activity plays a key role (for recent reviews see Moser et al, 
2015; Thom & Clayton, 2016).  
 
Some of the best evidence comes from studies of corvids, members of the crow 
family, whose cognitive abilities have earned them the title ‘Feathered Apes’ (Emery 
& Clayton, 2004, 2005). These birds hide food for the future and have excellent 
memories of specific past caching episodes~ of what they hid, where a d how long 
ago (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; de Kort el al., 2005), as well as keeping track of 
who was watching when they cached in a particular place (Dally et al., 2006). They 
can also update and generalize across situations, thereby demonstrating that these 
episodic-like memories can be flexibly deployed (Clayton et al., 2003b), and use this 
information to learn where and when not to cache in the future (Clayton et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, they can also plan for the future, knowing where to hide food for 
tomorrow’s breakfast  (Raby et al., 2007), and when to protect their caches from 
potential thieves (Emery & Clayton, 2001; Dally et al, 2006). The jays can ignore 
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their current needs at the time of caching in order to choose to cache those items 
they have learned they will want in the future when they come to recover and eat 
their caches (Cheke & Clayton, 2012; Correia et al., 2007). Given the ill-informed 
dietary choices humans often make, as alluded to earlier, such ability seems no small 
feat. Perhaps the reason the jays are able to dissociate current and future needs is 
precisely because they are not relying on episodic cognition, that subjective 
experience of thinking, which all too easily constrains our perception and our 
memories (Cheke et al., 2011).  
 
A number of other laboratories have subsequently investigated whether or not other 
animals have episodic-like cognition using paradigms analogous to those employed 
with the jays. There is now good evidence that a diverse range of animals can 
remember the what-where-and-when of past events, from cuttlefish to great apes, 
and that some primates are also capable of prospective cognition (see Clayton in 
press for a recent review). It remains to be seen, however, whether such behavioural 
criteria are sufficient to ascribe episodic cognition to these animals, but converging 
evidence from the cognitive development literature suggests that episodic-like 
memory (remembering what happened where and when) and the ability to plan for 
the future emerge at around the same time in young children as other tests of mental 
time travel (Clayton, 2014). 
 
Additional evidence comes from neurophysiological recordings of hippocampal 
activity. In humans, it is well known that the hippocampus is activated when 
subjects consciously engage in remembering the past and imagining the future, and  
analogous explorations of ‘replay recordings” of hippocampal activity in rodent 
models suggest that rats may also engage in such mental time travel (see Moser, 
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Rowland & Moser, 2015 for a recent review). 
 
Convergent Evidence 3 
The empirical testing so familiar to scientists is not the process that artists use in 
their form of enquiry. That is not to say that they are oblivious to the scientific 
method, but theirs is a process informed by an analysis of experiential concerns and 
self-enquiry, almost as if to say the recognition of self in its conscious state is the 
experiment that artists undertake. One’s personal response to stimulus becomes the 
focus for further artistic enquiry.  Often this is exemplified or embraced by the 
acceptance of the artist’s artifacts within society and culture. The level at which such 
conjecture can be accepted as true is part of that enquiry. In its broadest sense 
activity that takes place across millennia has at least stood the test of time and 
resonates in some way that must be significant. In this sense the construction of The 
Moustachio Quartet (Wilkins 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2017) is interesting, especially in 
terms of its collaborative nature as an arts-science project exploring memory and 
mental time travel. Each of the books features one of four characters who move over 
through and across the mythical city of Warcapest. In so doing they come across the 
characters from other books by accident or design.   
 
Such structure and the ensuing matrix of unfolding ideas and events allows for 
conjecture about how memory and mental time travel works. This is especially 
significant for the reader since the books can be read in any order. The inquisitive 
reader is able to understand the unfolding scenario in the order they read the books, 
but in addition find themselves doing the mental conjuring that allows for conjecture 
as to how understanding might be altered had the sequence been read differently, for 
this lies at the heart of the reconstructive nature of memory.  Furthermore, there are 
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choices to be made about what has been discovered and thereafter what should be 
remembered. The author has taken account of the reader’s prior knowledge, 
knowing that their current state of mind will cause them to automatically make 
assumptions about the scenario and other associations that may exist outside of the 
novels. It is implicit that the reader will reinterpret the scenario to suit their 
purposes and in so doing build the story in a form they understand. A good author 
recognizes that the story will be remembered not as they wish it to be but as the 
reader wishes it to be~ the reader seldom remembers what happened but what they 
remember becomes what happened. In this respect Warcapest, the city in which the 
action takes place, is a metaphor for culture and the endemic baggage it carries with 
it, the social history of a species as it were, replete with souvenirs and mementos and 
signposts that preserve and promote the collective unconscious. 
 
In short, the narrative causes questions to be raised that lie at the heart of how 
memory and mental time travel works. The artifice is so shallow as to entice the 
reader to ask whether the main characters are similar, if not the same as one another. 
Indeed, how could they be different given that the author has constructed them. All 
these issues operating in tandem offer the opportunity to question identity and 
perspective taking. 
 
Integrating approaches  
The process of collaboration provides insight that can be found in no other way and 
indeed this is a major strength of the comparative approach, of an analysis of the 
converging evidences concerning memory and mental time travel. This approach 
allows us to recognise the patterns we use to decipher the world (Berger, 1972). 
Integrating science and the arts allows us to focus on the common denominator of 
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our expertise, the human mind, and a comparison with animals offers a perspective 
on what it is like to engage in memory and mental time travel with and without 
words (Clayton & Wilkins, 2016). We begin to build a lexicon of the mechanisms in 
play and the patterns of thinking that are endemic across a variety of perceptual 
abilities.  The broader platform provides an opportunity for alternative kinds of 
enquiry and thinking that may highlight the limitations of human thought (see 
Clayton & Wilkins, in press). Understanding what we cannot do and the 
discrepancies in our thinking may be a way forward. 
 
In the final section we offer three observations. The first concerns time. As alluded 
to in the introduction physical time only appears to move in one direction, forwards. 
Although mental time travel moves bidirectionally, the time travelling patterns are 
different. When we reverse time in the mind’s eye we do not play it backwards in a 
continual fashion: we jump backwards and then play our imagining forwards again.  
This is in contrast to the gradual unfolding of events as we mentally travel forwards 
into a future that has not yet happened and may never happen in quite the way we 
envisage.  As the White Queen remarked to Alice in Lewis Carroll’s poignant tale 
Alice Through the Looking Glass, “it’s a poor sort of memory that only works 
backwards” (Carroll, 1871). 
 
The second issue concerns the reconstructive nature of memory. We know that our 
memories shimmer and change each time we revisit them so why do we feel the need 
to assume that what we remember encapsulates what actually happened? In recalling 
events, we constantly make comparisons and in so doing make judgments about the 
present with regard to the past and our understanding of what has gone before. 
However our memory cannot be an accurate reflection of what happened due to the 
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subjective nature of mental time travel.  The very process of comparing the present 
with the past, both defines the present and changes the past, and the process is on-
going~ like a train travelling a track it can never be in the same place twice. We are 
aware of the continuity of time, but only have the capacity to sample its passing. We 
chunk the unfolding moments into a series of snap shots, of events~ it’s the short 
hand of our thinking process, and then we search for ways to connect them, to join 
the missing dots. These ideas are poignantly expressed in the following quote from 
The Moustachio Quartet (Wilkins, 2015c, pp. 72-73), in which the main protagonist 
is reflecting on how to make sense and reinterpret the series of unfolding events in 
his memory. 
“Years pass by and experiences, myriad moments, and un-summoned influences in various 
measures, impose themselves on the retina and in the memory of living persons. Memories, by 
virtue of their nature, will seem significant and often support earlier remembrances beyond 
themselves~ or may even support experiences of memories yet to come. Long forgotten 
thoughts rise up again, when the need arises. What a rich tapestry of moments a person 
becomes over a lifetime! If nothing else, life is poignant.” 
“Memories are markers. They can be isolated, but should not be. Intervening times are the 
real measure; they are stranger and more significant than the memories themselves. I tell 
myself they are notable and have been important. I tell myself that maybe the intervening 
times should become cherished more than the memories.” 
 “The space between two memories is where I remember real life to have taken place, where 
life was lived unadorned, devoid of flourish, hubris and ostentation. The true complexion of 
how times pass is to be found here~ between two such points within a living memory. The 
measure can be quantified in easy stages~ this was my former self, when young, and then I 
grew into this~ each ensuing year a stepping-stone to the next new self, all individually 
recalled but seldom assessed, often forgotten and lost! A life is the space between one’s earliest 
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memory and where you find yourself now. That time that passes~ what does it all mean? 
How does one quantify the significance, effect or complexion of so many years? Why does it 
have to make sense? Why do I feel it has to make sense?” 
“It becomes a kind of madness to think of such things~ and it is in any case impossible to 
quantify a life in such a way. Who can make sense of everything, as if attempting to see the 
thread and the line that time follows?” 
 
There is a second point being made here. The brain is not only subjective in its 
selectivity, it is also anticipatory: those imagined edges that belong to boundary 
extension are where we build convergence into our worlds and engage in developing 
responses to the ideas and treasured memories we see as pertinent. Such things are 
signposts to our futures and lie at the heart of creativity, although of course 
semantic memory plays a key role too in allowing prior knowledge to be abstracted 
across many different experiences to structure and guide our current perceptions 
and future thoughts (e.g. Bubic & Abraham 2014, Irish & Piquet, 2013).. 
 
Finally, our need to collect mementoes and souvenirs of our experiences is of 
particular interest, an analysis of which may lead to some intriguing insights into 
the process of mental time travel. We might be referring to the post cards and other 
paraphernalia we select as ‘aides de memoire’, but more importantly the objects that 
we use to define us, the cars we drive, the architecture and buildings we live in, and 
the cities we create for ourselves. All these things become physical extensions to our 
excursions into mental time travel, to the thinking process with which we project 
ourselves in time. They anchor fleeting moments within our living memories, to 
connect the missing dots, to convert the chunks into continuity, and they cannot be 
forgotten or altered as easily as information that only exists as a memory. They take 
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on the role of artifacts, evidence that can be viewed objectively, physical adjuncts to 
the mechanism by which we explore possibilities, order information, and develop 
ideas.  
 
So memory is more than just the projection of our self and other selves in space and 
time. It also has to take account of the physical world, that is to say the manner in 
which we interact and bond with naturally occurring and man-made materials. 
These things are the architecture of our lives, and define the process by which we 
share memories with others. It is for this reason that the city of  Warcapest becomes 
the living backdrop to the lives of the main protagonists in The Moustachio 
Quartet~ much of what the characters think is defined by the environments in which 
they live and through which they move, and the objects and living things with which 
they associate. 
 
Everything leads one to conjecture that memories are made for the future.  
 
Page 21 of 28
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rsfs
Under review for Interface Focus
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Author Contributions 
NC and CW contributed equally to the content of this paper, and they wrote the 
manuscript together. 
 
Acknowledgements 
We thank the Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge for supporting 
our science-arts collaboration, and for appointing CW Artist-in-Residence. 
 
Funding Statement 
None.  
 
 
References 
 
Barlett, F. (1932). Remembering. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK. 
Berger, J. (1972). Ways of Seeing. Penguin, London, UK. 
Bubic, A. & Abraham, A. (2014). Neurocognitive bases of future perception. Review 
of Psychology, 21, 3-15. 
Carroll, L. (1965). Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. Macmillan Press, London, 
UK. 
Carroll, L. (1871). Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There. 
Macmillan Press, London, UK. 
Cheke, L. C. & Clayton, N. S. (2012). Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius) overcome 
their current desires to anticipate two distinct future needs and plan for them 
appropriately. Biology Letters, 8, 171-175. 
Cheke, L. G., Simons, J. S & Clayton, N. S.  (2016). Higher BMI is Associated with 
Episodic Memory Deficits in Young Adults.  Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 1-24. DOI:10.1080/1740218.2015.1099163 
Cheke, L. C., Thom, J. M., & Clayton, N. S. (2011). Prospective decision making in 
animals: a potential role for inter-temporal choice in the study of prospective 
cognition. In: Predictions in the Brain, edited by Bar, M, Chapter 24, pp. 325-354. 
Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Formatted: Font: Bold
Formatted: Font: Bold
Formatted: Font: Bold
Page 22 of 28
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rsfs
Under review for Interface Focus
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Clayton, N. S. (2014). EPS Mid Career Award Lecture. Ways of Thinking: From 
Crows to Children and Back Again. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology 68, 209-241.  
Clayton, N. S. (In press). Episodic-Like Memory and Mental Time Travel in 
Animals. In: Call, J. APA Handbook of Comparative Psychology. 
Clayton, N. S., Bussey, T. J., & Dickinson, A. (2003a). Can animals recall the past 
and plan for the future? Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4(8), 685-691. 
Clayton, N. S., Dally, J. M., Gilbert, J. D. J. & Dickinson, A.  (2005). Food Caching 
by Western Scrub-Jays (Aphelocoma californica) is sensitive to conditions at 
recovery. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes 31, 
115-124. 
Clayton, N. S., & Dickinson, A. (1998). Episodic-like memory during cache recovery 
by scrub jays. Nature, 395(6696), 272-278. 
Clayton, N. S. & Wilkins, C. A. P. (2012). Imagination: The Secret Landscape. Being 
Human. http://www.beinghuman.org/article/imagination-secret-landscape. 
Clayton, N. S. & Wilkins, C. A. P.  (2016). Big Picture: Art is the process of memory.  
The Psychologist, 29, 15-16. 
Clayton, N. S. & Wilkins, C. A. P.  (In press). The Creative Navigator’s Compass: 
Memory and Perception~ and how we know which way we are facing. The 
Psychologist in press. 
Clayton, N. S. Yu, K. S & Dickinson, A. (2003b). Interacting cache memories: 
evidence of flexible memory use by scrub jays. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes 29, 14-22. 
Craver, C. F., Kwan, D., Steindam, C. & Rosenbaum, S. R.  (2014). Individuals with 
episodic amnesia are not stuck in time. Neuropsychologia, 57, 191-195. 
Page 23 of 28
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rsfs
Under review for Interface Focus
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Corballis, M. C. (2013). Mental time travel: a case for evolutionary continuity. Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences, 17, 5–6.  
Corballis, M. C. (2014). Mental Time Travel: How The Mind Escapes From The 
Present. Cosmology, 18, 139-145.  
Corkin, S. (2013). Permanent Present tense. The unforgettable liofe of the amnesic 
patient H. M.  Basic books, New York, USA. 
Correia, S. P. C., Dickinson, A., & Clayton, N. S. (2007). Western Scrub-Jays 
(Aphelocoma californica) anticipate future needs independently of their current 
motivational state. Current Biology, 17, 856-861. 
de Kort, S. R., Dickinson, A., & Clayton, N. S. (2005). Retrospective cognition by 
food-caching Western scrub-jays. Learning and Motivation, 36, 159-176. 
Dally, J. M., Emery, N. J., & Clayton, N. S. (2006). Food-caching western scrub-jays 
keep track of who was watching when. Science, 312, 1662-1665. 
Dally, J. M., Emery, N. J. & Clayton, N. S. (2005). The effect of dominance status on 
cache protection strategies by western scrub-jays (Aphelocoma calfornica). 
Behaviour 142, 961-977. 
Emery, N. J., & Clayton, N. S. (2001). Effects of experience and social context on 
prospective caching strategies in scrub jays. Nature, 414(6862), 443–446.  
Emery, N. J. & Clayton, N. S. (2004). The mentality of crows. Convergent evolution 
of intelligence in corvids and apes. Science 306, 1903-1907. 
Emery, N. J. & Clayton, N. S. (2005). Evolution of brain and intelligence. Current 
Biology, 15, R946-950. 
Gilbert, D. (2006). Stumbling on Happiness. New York, NY: Knopf. 
Gottesman, C. V. & Intraub, H. (2002). Surface construal and the mental 
representation of scenes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance, 28, 1-11. 
Page 24 of 28
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rsfs
Under review for Interface Focus
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Gottesman, C. V. & Intraub, H. (2003). Constraints on spatial extrapolation in the 
mental representation of scenes. View-boundaries versus object boundaries. 
Visual Cognition, 10, 875-893. 
Green, J. (2006). An Abundance of Katherines. Dutton Books for Young Readers. 
New York, USA. ISBN 0525476881. 
Griffiths, D.P., Dickinson, A., & Clayton, N.S. (1999). Declarative and episodic 
memory: what can animals remember about their past? Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 3, 74-80. 
Hassabis, D., Kumaran, D., Vann, S. D., & Maguire, E. A. (2007). Patients with 
hippocampal amnesia cannot imagine new experiences. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 104, 1726-1731.  
Hassabis, D. & Maquire, E. A. (2007). Deconstructing episodic memory with 
construction. Trends in Cognitive Science, 11, 299-306. 
Intraub, H., and Richardson, M. (1989). Wide-angle memories of close-up scenes. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 15, 179-
187. 
Irish, M. & Piquet, O. (2013). The pivotal role of semantic memory in rememberuing 
the past and imagining the future. Frontiers ion Behavioural Neuroscience, 1, 27. 
Irish, M., Addis, D. R., Hodges, J. and Piquet, O. (2012). Exploring the content and 
quality of episodic future simulations inConsidering the role of  semantic memory 
in episodic future thinking: evidence from semantic dementia. 
NeuropyschologiaBrain, 50135, 34882178-34952179. 
 
James, W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology. Henry Holt and Company, New 
York, USA. 
Page 25 of 28
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rsfs
Under review for Interface Focus
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Klein, S. B., Loftus, J., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (2002). Memory and temporal experience: 
the effects of episodic memory loss on an amnesic patient's ability to remember 
the past and imagine the future. Social Cognition, 20, 353-379.  
Laland, K., Wilkins C. A. P. & Clayton, N. S. (2015). The Evolution of Dance. 
Current Biology 26, R5-9. 
Loftus, E.  (1974). Reconstruction of automobile destruction- Example of interaction 
between language and memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 
13, 585-589. 
Loftus, E. (1975). Leading questions and eyewitness report. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 
560-572. 
Loftus, E. (2005).  Planting misinformation in the human mind: A 30-year 
investigation of the malleability of memory. Learning and Memory, 12, 361-366. 
Loftus, E. F., Miller, D. G., & Burns, H. J. (1978). Semantic integration of verbal 
information into a visual memory. Journal of Exp rimental Psychology: Human 
Learning and Memory, 4, 19-31. 
Michaelian, K., Klein, S. B. & Szpunar, K. S. (2016). Seeing the future: theoretical 
operspectives on future-oriented mental time travel. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Moser, M. B., Rowland, D. C. & Moser, E. (2015). Place cells, grid cells, and 
memory. Cold Spring Harbour Perspectives in  Medicine, 7, a)21808. 
doi:0.1101/cshperspect.a021808. 
Mullally, S. L., Intraub, H. & Maguire, E. A. (2012). Attentuated boundary extension 
produces paradoxical memory advantage in amnesic patients. Current Biology, 
22, 261-268. 
Raby, C. R., Alexis, D. M., Dickinson, A., & Clayton, N. S. (2007).  Planning for the 
future by Western Scrub-Jays. Nature, 445(7130), 919-921. 
Page 26 of 28
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rsfs
Under review for Interface Focus
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Rosenbaum, R. S., Köhler, S., Schacter, D. L., Moscovitch, M., Westmacott, R., 
Black, S. E., Gao F.,  & Tulving, E. (2005).  The case of K.C.: contributions of a 
memory-impaired person to memory theory. Neuropsychologia, 43(7), 989-1021. 
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., & Buckner, R. L. (2007). Remembering the past to 
imagine the future: the prospective brain. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 8(9), 
657-661. 
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., & Buckner, R. L. (2008). Episodic Simulation of Future 
Events. Concepts, Data and Applications. Annual New York Academy of 
Sciences, 1124, 39-60. 
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., Hassabis, D., Martin, V. C., Spreng, N., & Szpunar, K. 
K. (2012). The future of memory: remembering, imagining and the brain. 
Neuron(4), 76, 677-694. 
Suddendorf, T., & Corballis, M. C. (1997). Mental time travel and the evolution of 
the human mind. Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs, 123(2), 
133-167. 
Thom, J. M. & Clayton, N. S. (2016). Evolutionary Perspectives on Prospective 
Cognition. In: Michaelian, K., Klein, S. B.  & Szpunar, K.K. Seeing the future: 
Theoretical perspectives on future-oriented mental time travel. Oxford 
University Press. Chapter 14, pp. 287-305. 
Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In: Organisation of Memory, 
edited by Tulving, E., & Donaldson, W., pp. 381-402. New York, NY: Academic 
Press. 
Tulving, E. (1983). Elements of episodic memory. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
Tulving, E. (2002). Episodic memory: From mind to brain. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 53, 1-25. 
Page 27 of 28
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rsfs
Under review for Interface Focus
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Tulving, E. (2005). Episodic memory and Autonoesis: Uniquely Human? In: The 
Missing Link in Cognition. Origins in Self-Reflective Consciousness, edited by 
Terrace, H. & Metcalfe, J., pp. 3-56. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Wearing, D. (2005). Forever Today: A Mmeoir of Love and Amnesia. Corgi Press, 
UK. 
Wheeler, M. A. (2000). Episodic memory and autonoetic awareness. In: The Oxford 
Handbook of Memory, edited by Tulving, E., & Craik, F. I. M.  pp.597-625. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.  
Wilkins, C. A. P. (2008). Creatures in the Night. Dingley Press, Dingley, UK. 
Wilkins, C. A. P. (2015a). The Moustachio Quartet~ Mannikin. Wind on the Wire 
Publishing, Rutland, UK. 
Wilkins, C. A. P. (2015b). The Moustachio Quartet~ Count Zapik. Wind on the 
Wire Publishing, Rutland, UK. 
Wilkins, C. A. P. (2015c). The Moustachio Quartet~ Caruso. Wind on the Wire 
Publishing, Rutland, UK. 
Wilkins, C. A. P. (2017). The Moustachio Quartet~ Eissenstrom. Wind on the Wire 
Publishing, Rutland, UK. 
 
 
 
 
Page 28 of 28
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rsfs
Under review for Interface Focus
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
